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Abstract: The present study analyses influence of board structure and cash holdings on the value of 
Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2010.  Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) adopted the Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance Guidelines in 2003 and Australian firms have started adopting these 
principles starting 2004.  Similarly the reporting framework of Australian firms is harmonized with the 
rest of the world with adoption of Australian International Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS) 
starting in 2004. Corporate cash holdings despite their significance have not been considered extensively 
in prior literature outside the US.  Cash holdings may have significant influence on the value of the firm as 
too much excess cash may lead to misuse of these funds by entrenched managers.  Corporate governance 
has a role to play in maintaining appropriate cash holdings and their use.  The present has two objectives: 
it considers the influence of corporate cash holdings on the value of Australian firms; and it examines the 
role of board structure on the relationship between cash holdings and value of the firm.  The present 
study considers all non-financial firms that are part of the All Ordinaries Index (AOI). The present study 
constructs Fama French 25 portfolio and estimate the excess return as the difference between actual 
return and the average return of the relevant FF portfolio. OLS analyses show that board independence 
has no significant impact on the value of the firm though cash holdings have significant influence. 
Analysing using panel data methods however unearth the significant influence of board independence on 
the value of Australian firms.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Cash holdings are an important consideration for corporate firms given the many purposes that cash and 
its equivalents provide.  Cash holdings help firms meet not only day to day transactions but help firms 
meet contingencies that may arise from unanticipated events and also help them take on opportunities 
that may arise.  Cash holdings or broadly liquidity helps firms to undertake investment opportunities 
without having to incur significant transaction costs though either debt or equity issues (Faulkender & 
Wang, 2006).  However, cash holdings may also present opportunities for managers to invest in sub-
optimal projects and empire building (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly corporations pay a higher tax 
on interested earned on their cash holdings compared to investors and this may mean a dollar in cash 
may add less than a dollar of value.  Savings on transaction costs and the benefits of precautionary 
holdings may mean a dollar of cash adds more than a dollar of value to firms.  The present study extends 
the empirical literature on corporate cash holdings in several ways.  First, it considers a market 
characterized by tax imputation system that avoids double taxation.  Second, the present study considers 
board characteristics and their influence on cash holdings and value of firm as governance is likely to 
influence the use or misuse of cash balances.  Third, the present study controls for endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity.  The present has two objectives: it considers the influence of corporate cash 
holdings on the value of Australian firms; and it examines the role of board structure on the relationship 
between cash holdings and value of the firm. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Corporate firms hold cash balances mainly for transaction, precautionary and speculative purposes. Cash 
balances help firms perform day to day activities or meet the transactional needs. Apart from this firms 
may also hold cash for meeting unanticipated expenses as well as for speculative purposes.  Growing 
firms are likely to hold higher balances of cash with a view to reduce the cost of external financing.  Kim, 
Mauer, and Sherman (1998)propose a trade-off model of liquidity that positively relates liquidity with 
cost of external funds, riskiness of expected cash flows and expected return on investments and that 
negatively relates liquidity with return on present investments. Firms hold optimal liquidity where the 
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benefits of holding liquid investments are just equal to marginal cost of holding such investments.  Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)also find that for a sample of US firms for the period 1971 to 
1994 high cash balances are positively associated with growth opportunities, riskiness of cash flows and 
firm profitability.  Firms with better access to capital markets and higher credit ratings on the other hand 
hold lower cash balances.  They find no evidence of firms with excess cash resorting to higher capital 
expenditure or acquisitions and paying out higher dividends.  Operating losses have a significant impact 
on the changes in excess cash.  Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)analyse the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings of a sample of UK firms for the period 1984 to 1999.  They find evidence of non-linear 
relationship between cash holdings and managerial ownership.  At low levels of managerial ownership, 
companies hold lower cash balances as the ownership rises but after a threshold level of ownership, the 
cash balances rise with ownership and finally at very high levels of managerial ownership cash balances 
again fall with the rise in ownership. They find that the effect of managerial ownership persists and is 
unaffected by variations in board composition as well as when controlled for other effects.  In the absence 
of agency costs, one dollar of cash holdings should be equal to one dollar of value for the firm.  On the 
other hand in the presence of agency costs, one dollar of cash holdings will have a lower value for the firm 
and the value of cash holdings is dependent on investor protection and governance mechanisms.  Firms in 
countries characterized by low investor protection have lower value of cash holdings compared to 
countries where investor protection is stronger (Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2006).  
 
Marginal benefits and costs of cash holdings may ultimately determine the impact that cash holdings have 
on the value of a firm.  Faulkender and Wang (2006)find that value of cash balances declines with larger 
cash holdings, higher leverage, greater access to financial markets and their choice of dividends over 
repurchases when distributing cash to shareholders.  Size of a firm is likely to influence cash holdings of 
firms.  Smaller firms are likely to hold larger cash balances compared to larger firms (Chang 
&Noorbakhsh, 2006).  For a sample of 22,000 firms from 48 countries, Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006) 
find that firms in countries with greater investor protection hold lower cash ratios.  Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) identify three reasons why cash is important for the value of a firm:  ease of access – 
managers have flexibility in terms of using cash for discretionary purposes; increased trend in holding 
cash balances – cash holdings constitute a significant proportion of value held by companies; and 
volatility in cash holdings – firm level cash holdings have fluctuated widely.  They find that corporate 
governance has a significant impact on the value of cash holdings.  A $ 1 of cash has only a value of $0.42 
to $0.88 in firms that are poorly governed and that this value doubles when firms are well governed.  
Similarly they find that poor governance leads to inefficient use of cash leading to poor operating 
performance.  Drobetz and Grüninger (2007) analyse the cash holdings of a firms of Switzerland for the 
period 1995 and 2004 and find that Swiss firms hold on average twice as much cash as that of the US and 
UK firms.  They also find evidence of non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and cash 
holdings of Swiss firms and that firms that have CEO-Chairman duality have on average more cash 
holdings.  Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) analyse the influence of corporate governance on the cash 
holdings of firms in the US for the period 1993 to 2004.  In weakly governed firms corporate cash 
holdings are smaller and that these firms quickly use up cash in acquiring firms and other capital 
expenditure.  Similarly poorly governed firms payout cash in the form of share repurchases rather than 
paying dividends with a view to avoid future commitments associated with dividend payments.  They also 
find that firms with weaker governance structures and excess cash holdings to be less profitable and 
often have poor valuations.   
 
Chen and Chuang (2009) underline the importance of investment or growth opportunities in determining 
the influence of corporate governance on cash holdings of firms.  Corporate governance ensure that 
investors interests are protected when firms hold large cash holdings and that firms will invest these cash 
balances in positive value adding projects.  They find that ownership held by CEO, presence of venture 
capitalists on the board and board independence play a significant role in determining the cash holdings 
of firms.  They also find that corporate governance is particularly significant in the case of younger firms.  
Lee and Lee (2009) analyse the influence of board structure and managerial ownership on the value of 
corporate cash holdings.  They find that firms with smaller boards, highly independent boards and lower 
managerial shareholding have lower cash holdings.  They also find negative association between cash 
holdings and firm value is highly significant in the case of firms less outside directors, larger boards and 
higher managerial ownership. They conclude that firms with large cash holdings and higher managerial 
ownership face significant valuation discount as investors are concerned about the opportunities for 
managers to invest in sub-optimal projects.  A few earlier studies have conducted surveys to elicit the 
views of managers with regard to corporate cash and liquidity policies.  Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) 
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survey financial officers from 29 countries with regard to their use of lines of credit versus non-
operational cash.  They find that firms use lines of credit when credit markets are not well developed and 
that majority of use lines of credit as a dominant source of liquidity.  They conclude that firms employ 
non-operational cash holdings as a cushion against future cash flow shocks while credit lines provide 
them options to pursue investment opportunities that may arise in future.  Powell and Baker (2010) on 
the other hand find that managers believe that governance mechanisms influence the cash holdings and 
how the cash is spent but managers do not believe that governance impacts the value of cash holdings.   
 
Frésard and Salva (2010) find the positive effects of cross listings of firms.  They find that firms that have 
cross listing on the US exchanges and the over-the-counter markets have better valuations than their 
domestic peers.  Cross listing helps firm derive higher valuations from excess cash holdings compared to 
firms that do not cross list.  They conclude that US cross listing helps rein insider misuse of funds.  Kuan, 
Li, and Chu (2011) examine the role corporate governance plays in the corporate cash holding policy of 
Taiwanese family owned firms.  They find that the influence of managerial ownership and board 
independence have different impacts on family firms compared to their impact on non-family firms.  
Kuan, Li, and Liu (2012) confirm these results with regression approach.  Kusnadi (2011) analyse the 
influence of corporate governance structure on the corporate cash holdings and valuation of Malaysian 
and Singaporean firms.  They find evidence of weak governance and higher levels of cash holdings for 
firms in both countries.  They also find that investors discount the value of firms with higher cash 
holdings in the presence of poor governance mechanisms.  They also show that duality, pyramidal 
ownership structure and family control of firms have significant negative impact on the value of firms.  
They conclude that the discounted valuation is the result of investors’ concern relating to entrenchment 
of managers.  Liu and Mauer (2011) analyse the relationship between CEO compensation, corporate cash 
holdings and the value of corporate firms.  They find a positive relationship between risk-taking 
incentives of CEOs and corporate cash holdings and a negative relationship between risk-taking 
incentives of CEOs and value of cash to shareholders.  They find that the negative effect of risk-taking 
incentives does not exist in the case of financially constrained firms and is present in the case of levered 
firms.  Most of the prior literature focused on the US and UK context.  Therefore the present study 
examines the trends in cash holdings in Australia and examines the association between corporate 
governance, cash holdings and the value of firms.   
 
3. Methodology 
 
The initial sample for this study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX).  Financial firms are excluded given the nature of their business activity and the amount of 
regulation that they are subject to.  Similarly firms from real estate sector are excluded given their 
similarity to financial services. The final sample consists of 4631 firm years for 662 firms (Table 01).  
Sample firms are distributed across a wide range of sectors with basic material, energy, consumer 
cyclicals, industrials and healthcare sectors accounting for a major proportion. The study period of 2004 
to 2010 is considered as the ASX has adopted the ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations’ in March 2003.  Similarly Australia has adopted the Australian International 
Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS) starting in 2004 and the study period represents a new reporting 
framework.  In terms of macroeconomic conditions, despite the recent global financial crisis (GFC), 
Australia continued to have significant core strength with inflation and unemployment under control. 
   
 
Table 01: Distribution of sample firms across sectors
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Basic Materials 220 223 223 223 223 223 223 1558
Consumer Cyclicals 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 651
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 182
Energy 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 728
Healthcare 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 427
Industrials 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 602
Technology 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 322
Telecommunications 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 98
Utilities 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 63
Total 659 662 662 662 662 662 662 4631
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Financial information such as market capitalization, cash holdings, earnings, net assets, R&D, inventory, 
dividend payout, long-term debt, net financing cash flows, free cash flow, net working capital and 
intangibles is sourced from DataStream. Independence, duality and board size measures are constructed 
based on the information sourced from SIRCA database.  To examine the influence of cash holdings and 
corporate governance on the value of Australian firms, first Fama French (FF) 25 portfolios are 
constructed for all the firms for which total return data is available from DataStream for the period 2004 
to 2010 (Fama & French, 1993).  Similar to Fama and French, quintiles of market capitalization and 
market to book value are formed first.  Based on these quintiles, 25 portfolios are formulated that include 
firms with large size and high growth on one end of the spectrum and small size and low growth on the 
other extreme with intermediate portfolios representing combinations of size and growth.  Two separate 
sets of 25 portfolios are formulated on market capitalization weighted and equal weighted bases.  Excess 
return is calculated as the difference between observed total return and the relevant portfolio return.  
ERw and EReq measure the excess return based on market capitalization weighted portfolios and 
equally-weighted portfolios respectively (Table 02).  Use of both measures of excess returns helps in 
establishing the validity of the results.  
  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Cash holdings of Australian firms are an average 32.2 per cent of market value (Table 03).  This is 
comparable to firms in the US and UK.  Cash holdings declined from 37.8 per cent of market value in 2004 
to 25.2 per cent in 2005 before gradually increasing to 42.1 per cent in 2007.  They dropped from this 
peak to 16.9 per cent in 2009 before recovering to the highest level of 48.5 per cent in 2010.  On the 
whole cash holdings as a per cent of market value have fluctuated widely during the study period (Table 
04). Average excess returns on average for the sample firms over the period 2004 to 2010 is 1 per cent on 
an weighted average basis and is a negative 3.3 per cent on the equal weighted basis.  Excess returns on 
the whole fluctuated widely during the study period with a high of 6.6 per cent in 2007 and a low of a 
negative 8.1 per cent in 2010 on market value weighted basis.  On equal weighted basis, the fluctuations 
are even higher with a high of 1.5 per cent in 2008 and a low of a negative 22.2 per cent in 2010.  Board 
characteristics have also undergone gradual change over the study period particularly in terms of board 
independence and CEO-Chairman duality. Median board independence at 75 per cent for the sample 
period compares well with many OECD countries.  Board independence increased steadily from 67.5 per 
cent in 2004 to 73.6 per cent in 2010.  CEO-Chairman duality on the other hand had gradually declined 
Table 02: Variables employed in the study
Variable Definition or explanation
ChtCash Change in cash holdings
Cht2Cash Change in cash holdings over the last two years
ChtEarn Change in earnings
ChtNA Change in net assets (excluding cash holdings)
ChtRD Change in R&D
ChtInv Change in inventory
ChtDiv Change in dividend payout
Lit Long-term debt
NFit Net financing cash flows
FCFMV Free cash flow
NWCMV Net working capital (excluding cash holdings)
IntngMV Intangibles
ERw Excess return based on weighted average FF portfolio 
EReq Excess return based on equal weighted  average FF portfolio
CashMv Cash holdings
LnMV Natural logarithm of market capitalization
Independence Proportion of independent directors on a board
Duality CEO-Chairman duality.  1 indicates duality 0 indicates separation
BoardSize Number of board of directors on a board
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from an already low level of around 8 per cent to 4.7 per cent in 2010.  Board size has shown steady levels 
during the entire sample period and the average board size of Australian firms stood at around 6.  
Changes in board composition better reflect the recent thrust on good governance.  Average Australian 
board size is neither too small nor too large at an average board size of 6 members.  Majority of these 
board members are now overwhelmingly non-executive or independent directors.  Similarly the numbers 
of boards which have the same person performing the Chairperson and the CEO rule have fallen further 
and stand at 4.7 per cent in 2010.   
   
 
 
An examination of correlations is undertaken to rule out the possibility of multicollinearity in the 
variables employed (Table 5).   The two excess returns measured are highly significantly positively 
related.  Given that only one variable will be employed at any one point in time, these high correlations do 
not pose any problems for further analysis.  Correlations relating to board characteristics with other 
variables are low indicating their appropriateness in the analysis.  Net financing cash flows and free cash 
flow are positively significant with high correlation values.  Free cash flows are only employed when 
estimating the expected level of cash flows for the firms and net financing cash flows are not part of this 
analysis.  Net financing cash flows are only employed when estimating the impact of cash holdings and 
board characteristics on the value of firms. The empirical analysis of influence of cash holdings and 
corporate governance on the value of firms is undertaken in three stages.  In the first stage, excess returns 
are regressed on level of cash holdings as well as changes in cash holdings, governance and a set of other 
control variables using OLS analyses.  In the second stage, expected cash holdings are estimated based on 
market value, free cash flow, net working capital and intangibles using a panel analysis framework.  All 
the variables employed are standardized by market value.  Excess cash holdings are calculated by 
subtracting the expected cash flows from the actual cash flows.  In the third stage, excess cash holdings 
are regressed on the independent variables employed in the first stage using fixed effects panel analysis. 
 
In OLS analyses as well as fixed effects panel data analyses a total of 6 models are employed for excess 
returns calculated on market value weighted basis and equal weighted basis (Table 06).  The first 3 
models pertain to excess returns calculated on the basis of market value weighted basis and models 4 to 6 
employ excess returns calculated on equal value basis.  Models 1 and 4 capture the influence of level of 
cash holdings and changes in cash holdings, earnings, and net assets excluding cash holdings, research 
and development investments, inventory, dividends, as well as leverage and net financing cash flows on 
Table 03: Descriptive statistics for variables employed
variable mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max skewness kurtosis
ChtCash 0.090 0.782 -28.975 -0.042 0.004 0.092 20.782 -2.858 590.370
Cht2Cash 0.116 0.791 -6.768 -0.039 0.014 0.129 29.026 17.711 557.054
ChtEarn -0.002 2.262 -139.350 -0.067 0.008 0.085 16.800 -52.469 3239.683
ChtNA 0.184 1.326 -11.715 -0.062 0.025 0.179 28.278 8.904 150.276
ChtRD 0.004 0.082 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.272 42.036 1992.997
ChtInv 0.047 0.496 -5.508 -0.011 0.001 0.026 17.850 20.496 671.230
ChtDiv 0.002 0.046 -1.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.046 1.800 263.665
Lit 0.287 0.862 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.265 18.933 9.896 145.956
NFit 0.298 1.686 -4.117 -0.020 0.047 0.267 81.225 30.352 1287.319
FCFMV -0.164 2.346 -144.250 -0.187 -0.033 0.076 15.754 -51.659 3101.513
NWCMV -0.047 0.579 -10.663 -0.081 -0.011 0.052 6.647 -3.947 73.347
IntngMV 0.254 0.892 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.198 24.957 13.217 269.524
ERw 0.010 0.851 -3.436 -0.404 -0.107 0.224 6.946 2.211 13.406
EReq -0.033 0.840 -3.532 -0.449 -0.132 0.191 6.263 2.123 12.834
CashMv 0.322 0.808 0.000 0.041 0.123 0.333 0.890 16.767 475.126
LnMV 3.830 2.164 3.507 2.257 3.400 5.105 11.883 0.714 3.231
Independence 0.700 0.171 0.000 0.600 0.750 0.833 0.938 -0.919 3.870
Duality 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.423 12.714
BoardSize 5.950 2.338 3.000 4.000 5.000 7.000 17.000 1.202 4.931
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the excess returns. Models 2 and 5 incorporate interaction terms that capture level of cash holdings and 
change in cash holdings and leverage and level of cash holdings in addition to other financial variables 
included in Models 1 and 4.  Models 3 and 6 include governance variables in addition to variables 
employed in Models 2 and 5. Models 1 and 4 show that level of cash holdings and changes in cash 
holdings have significant positive impact on the excess returns or the value of firms.  Leverage on the 
other hand has significant negative influence on the value of firms.  Models 2 and 5 show that the joint 
effect of leverage and level of cash holdings is negative on the value of firms, whereas Models 3 and 6 
show that this joint effect does not persist when governance variables are included in the analysis.  In the 
presence of governance variables, the joint effect of level of cash holdings and change in cash holdings is 
negative implying that at high levels of cash holdings, additional increases in cash holdings will have a 
negative influence on the value of the firms as investors are worried about the excess free cash flow 
available to managers.  Board size has a significant negative impact on the value of firm, however this 
effect is not observed in the case of excess returns calculated on the basis of market value weighted 
portfolio. 
   
 
 
 
Table 04: Trends in variables over the study period
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
ChtCash 0.078 0.059 0.115 0.203 0.066 0.006 0.104 0.090
Cht2Cash 0.102 0.135 0.269 0.120 0.018 0.053 0.116
ChtEarn -0.118 -0.003 -0.040 -0.007 0.002 0.006 0.147 -0.002
ChtNA 0.278 -0.059 0.250 0.399 0.170 -0.028 0.275 0.184
ChtRD 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.004
ChtInv 0.091 0.033 0.061 0.074 0.033 0.001 0.035 0.047
ChtDiv 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.002
Lit 0.285 0.253 0.269 0.248 0.201 0.468 0.285 0.287
NFit 0.532 0.230 0.310 0.403 0.213 0.043 0.360 0.298
FCFMV -0.384 -0.100 -0.171 -0.138 -0.083 -0.077 -0.196 -0.164
NWCMV -0.060 -0.004 -0.028 -0.067 -0.039 -0.048 -0.081 -0.047
IntngMV 0.301 0.248 0.220 0.216 0.215 0.150 0.430 0.254
ERw 0.065 0.010 0.002 0.066 0.033 -0.028 -0.081 0.010
EReq 0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.022 0.015 0.012 -0.222 -0.033
CashMv 0.378 0.252 0.298 0.421 0.249 0.169 0.485 0.322
LnMV 3.398 3.616 3.761 4.145 4.376 3.454 4.057 3.830
Independence 0.675 0.683 0.693 0.698 0.710 0.726 0.736 0.700
Duality 0.079 0.085 0.074 0.058 0.059 0.065 0.047 0.068
BoardSize 5.898 5.888 5.946 6.100 5.967 5.828 6.093 5.950
ChtCash Cht2Cash ChtEarn ChtNA ChtRD ChtInv ChtDiv Lit NFit FCFMV NWCMV IntngMV ERw EReq CashMv LnMV
Cht2Cash 0.88
ChtEarn 0.56
ChtNA 0.17 0.20
ChtRD 0.33 0.48 0.06
ChtInv 0.42 -0.61 0.28
ChtDiv 0.06 0.13 0.10
NFit 0.73 -0.75 0.29 0.28 0.74         
FCFMV 0.45 -0.12 0.94 -0.09 -0.54         -0.75
NWCMV 0.14 -0.15 0.11 -0.13         -0.21 -0.17 0.19
IntngMV 0.44 0.09 0.18 0.09 -0.17
ERw 0.24 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.07 -0.06 0.20 0.08
EReq 0.24 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.98
CashMv 0.72 0.89 0.25 0.44 0.30 0.06 0.51 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.36 0.36
LnMV         -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09         -0.11
Independence         -0.07         0.23
Duality                 
BoardSize         0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 0.59
Note: Only correlations significant at 1% are reported
Table 05: Correlations
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OLS analysis suffers from unobserved heterogeneity and hence the present study employs FE analyses to 
examine the level of expected cash flows and the influence of excess cash on the value of firms.  Fixed 
effects panel data analysis shows that excess cash has a significant negative influence on the value of 
firms, whereas level of cash holdings has a significant positive influence (Table 07).  Change in earnings, 
R&D, dividends and net financing cash flows have positive influence on the value of firms where as 
leverage has a significant negative influence on the value of firms.  Firms that have higher excess cash and 
independent boards add value to the firms and similarly larger boards add value to the firm when firms 
have excess cash holdings.   
 
  
Table 06: Influence of cash and governance on excess returns: OLS analyses
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ERw ERw ERw EReq EReq EReq
ChtCash 0.3908*** 0.4225*** 0.4930*** 0.3938*** 0.4164*** 0.4917***
(5.29) (5.59) (5.35) (5.17) (5.52) (5.40)
ChtEarn 0.0335 0.0343 0.0056 0.0401 0.0378 0.0084
(1.18) (0.99) (0.10) (1.38) (1.07) (0.14)
ChtNA 0.0570* 0.0646* 0.0223 0.0556* 0.0622* 0.0240
(2.30) (2.28) (0.68) (2.28) (2.24) (0.76)
ChtRD -0.9508 -0.9014 3.1321 -1.0601 -1.0618 3.4312
(-1.23) (-1.00) (1.50) (-1.31) (-1.12) (1.82)
ChtInv 0.2566* 0.2617* 0.1646 0.2391* 0.2426* 0.1397
(2.52) (2.56) (1.17) (2.36) (2.37) (0.99)
ChtDiv 0.3875 0.3486 0.2836 0.2908 0.2754 0.2239
(0.71) (0.66) (0.48) (0.56) (0.55) (0.40)
LCash 0.4533*** 0.4434*** 0.5194*** 0.4894*** 0.4808*** 0.5683***
(4.26) (4.11) (4.02) (4.41) (4.23) (4.14)
Lit -0.0554*** -0.0516*** -0.0395** -0.0450*** -0.0418*** -0.0263*
(-4.37) (-4.47) (-3.26) (-3.67) (-3.74) (-2.24)
NFit -0.0156 -0.0272 0.0007 -0.0093 -0.0152 0.0089
(-0.33) (-0.47) (0.01) (-0.20) (-0.26) (0.12)
LCash XChtCash -0.0027 -0.0905* -0.0012 -0.0961*
(-0.29) (-2.41) (-0.12) (-2.36)
Lit X LCash -0.0738* -0.0080 -0.0710* -0.0082
(-2.08) (-0.18) (-1.97) (-0.17)
Independence 0.0923 0.1017
(1.01) (1.16)
Duality 0.0360 0.0240
(0.68) (0.46)
BoardSize -0.0068 -0.0229***
(-1.23) (-4.21)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -0.0476 -0.0503 -0.1219 -0.1201* -0.1232* -0.1195
(-0.88) (-0.91) (-1.34) (-2.20) (-2.22) (-1.34)
Firm Years 4407 4407 2736 4407 4407 2736
R2 0.1780 0.1798 0.1816 0.1968 0.1985 0.2083
Adj R2 0.1737 0.1752 0.1732 0.1926 0.1939 0.2001
F 9.4516 9.4868 6.4602 12.6548 12.3705 9.4007
Note: t statistics in parentheses
*, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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5. Conclusion 
 
The present study examines the level of cash holdings of Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2010 and 
analyses the influence of level of cash holdings and excess cash as well as the impact of governance on the 
value of firms.  Australian firms on average hold 32.2 per cent of assets in cash and this ratio increased to 
a high level of 48.5 per cent in 2010.  Concerns relating to global financial crisis and the desire of 
companies to meet unanticipated expenses may have led to this increase in cash holdings.  Similarly firms 
may also want to hold these higher cash balances for speculative purposes as new opportunities arise, 
firms may want minimize the cost of raising external financing.  Fixed effects analysis shows that excess 
cash has a significant negative influence on the value of firms while profitability, growth opportunities 
and dividend payout as well as level of cash holdings have a positive significant influence on the value.  
Leverage on the other hand has a significant negative influence on the value of firms.  The present study 
also provides evidence that good governance can help firms improve value when holding excess cash as 
investors interests are protected by independent and large boards. 
 
 
 
Table 07: Influence of excess cash and governance on excess returns - FE Analysis 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ERw ERw ERw EReq EReq EReq
excash -2.0109*** -0.4793* -1.1076*** -1.8990*** -0.4181* -1.0146***
(-7.29) (-2.44) (-4.84) (-7.03) (-2.18) (-4.53)
ChtEarn 0.1399*** 0.0532* 0.0168 0.1323*** 0.0495* 0.0154
(5.24) (2.18) (0.66) (5.06) (2.07) (0.62)
ChtNA 0.0016 0.0196 0.0236 0.0010 0.0192 0.0228
(0.10) (1.28) (1.55) (0.07) (1.28) (1.53)
ChtRD 3.6259** 3.8045** 3.7254** 3.6948** 3.8765** 3.7914**
(2.84) (2.94) (2.90) (2.95) (3.07) (3.01)
ChtInv 0.0149 0.0076 -0.0520 0.0145 0.0080 -0.0486
(0.30) (0.15) (-1.00) (0.30) (0.16) (-0.96)
ChtDiv 1.2298*** 1.2969*** 1.2468*** 1.2033*** 1.2719*** 1.2273***
(3.40) (3.54) (3.42) (3.40) (3.55) (3.44)
LCash 1.3809*** 0.9599*** 1.0316*** 1.2902*** 0.8845*** 0.9590***
(7.02) (4.93) (5.43) (6.70) (4.65) (5.16)
Lit -0.0732*** -0.0646** -0.0632** -0.0568** -0.0483* -0.0471*
(-3.45) (-3.02) (-2.97) (-2.74) (-2.31) (-2.27)
NFit 0.2418*** 0.2098*** 0.2365*** 0.2425*** 0.2114*** 0.2364***
(9.38) (8.15) (9.03) (9.60) (8.40) (9.22)
excash X 
Independence 1.6690*** 1.6156***
(7.86) (7.77)
Independence 0.0889 0.0742
(0.65) (0.56)
excash X Duality 0.0861 0.0399
(0.37) (0.17)
Duality 0.1666 0.1648
(1.86) (1.88)
BoardSize -0.0287* -0.0345**
(-2.36) (-2.90)
excash X BoardSize 0.1187*** 0.1110***
(4.99) (4.77)
Intercept -0.3525*** -0.0209 -0.0290 -0.3912*** -0.0404 -0.0485
(-3.32) (-0.26) (-0.36) (-3.76) (-0.50) (-0.61)
Firm years 2714 2714 2714 2714 2714 2714
R2 0.1453 0.1259 0.1341 0.1444 0.1267 0.1341
Adj R2 -0.0342 -0.0582 -0.0478 -0.0354 -0.0572 -0.0478
F 34.6550 26.8953 31.5763 34.3962 27.1013 31.5739
Note: t statistics in parentheses
*, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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